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THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSiVE LEGISLATION IN THE
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES
Laura A. Wakefleld*
I. INTRODUCTION
To SUCCESSFULLY DEVELOP a market-oriented economy, the Russian
Federation must carefully protect and encourage its newly privatized oil
and gas industries, the bulwarks of its economy. To foster growth and
development of these industries, the country must immediately develop a
comprehensive energy law that will encourage foreign investment while
limiting waste and environmental degradation, both of which threaten the
nation's financial health.
Part II of this Note describes the Russian oil and gas industries and
the privatization process. Next, it demonstrates Russia's extensive depen-
dence on its energy industry. Part m then analyzes the development of
Russian energy law and other applicable laws and their current status.
Lastly, Part IV argues that comprehensive energy law and related legisla-
tion is necessary to encourage foreign investment and financial stability.
I. PRIVATIZATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991. By 1993, the Russian
Federation had emerged as an independent state with its own constitu-
tion.2 However, other states that had previously emerged from the shad-
ow of the Soviet Union like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
are farther along than Russia in the process of creating market-oriented
economies. Because Communist rule so pervaded Russian society, Russia
faces a greater challenge in privatization than these other states.4 None-
theless, Russia, which is in the early stages of its new existence, is just
beginning to privatize its state-owned industries and property, has the
* B.A., University of Dayton, 1993; J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law 1997. The author wishes to thank Professor Edward A.
Mearns, Jr., Case Western Reserve University School of Law, for his guidance and
encouragement.
I DAVID E. BIRENBAUM, BusiNEss VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RussiA,
ch. 1, at 2 (2d ed. Supp. 1994).
2 See generally KONST. RF [Constitution] (Russian Federation) (1993).
See Doran Doeh & Mathieu Fabre-Magnan, Russia, in PRIVATIZATION: A WORLD
PRIVATIZATION GumE 65 (Christopher Zach ed., 1994).
4 BIRENBAUM, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 18.
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advantage of being able to learn from the experiences of other former
Communist states that gained independence before Russia.'
Russia earnestly began its privatization plan in 1993, even before it
adopted its constitution.6 On May 8, 1993, the government issued the
decree State Guarantees for the Right of the Citizens of Russia to Partici-
pate in Privatization. This decree guaranteed each Russian the right to
obtain a share of state property.'
Once the privatization process began, it was carried out primarily by
two state organizations: the Committee for the Management of State
Property (Goskomimuschestvo or GKI) and the State Property Fund.9 The
GKI organizes and oversees the privatization process and creates the
regulation and policy behind privatization.'" The State Property Fund car-
ries out the specifics of actual privatization transactions, such as organiz-
ing auctions and distributing vouchers to Russian citizens." The Property
Fund also holds the state's interests in the enterprises to be privatized
until those enterprises are sold.'2 By the close of 1993, these two or-
ganizations assisted in the privatization of an estimated 39,000 formerly
state-owned enterprises.'
3
After this initial push towards privatization, the country experienced
a privatization backlash, in which large portions of the public sought to
stop the privatization of more state property. Much of the oil and gas
industry was placed on a list of government-owned property not to be
converted to private ownership.'4 Privatization in general came to a
standstill, but desperate for cash, the government began a second phase
5 See id.
6 See Doeh & Fabre-Magnan, supra note 3, at 65.
7 State Guarantees for the Right of Citizens of Russia to Participate in Privatiza-
tion R.F. President's Edict No. 640, RusData Dialine, May 8, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rusleg File.
' See Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of State Property in
Post-Socialist Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 131,
143 (1993).
9 See Doeh & Fabre-Magnan, supra note 3, at 66.
10 See BIRENBAUM, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 27.
" See Doeh & Fabre-Magnan, supra note 3, at 66.
12 See BIRENBAUM, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 27.
13 See Doeh & Fabre-Magnan, supra note 3, at 65.
" See Russia's Second Privatization Wave, FIN. TIMES LTD. EAST EUROPEAN
ENERGY REP., Aug. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Cumws File
[hereinafter Russia's Second Privatization]. The privatization of the Russian oil and gas
industry refers to state-owned enterprises, rights to extract or transport oil or gas, and
so forth. The oil and gas resources themselves are prohibited from being privatized and
will remain the property of the Russian state. BIRENBAUM, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 25.
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of privatization in the fall of 1995.Y "Unlike the first stage of voucher
privatisation in 1993, the government [in 1995 was projected to] sell its
shares in enterprises for cash to help fund the. . . federal budget deficit
and inject money into the privatized companies."" However, much of
the energy industry is deemed too important for the government to
relinquish control. Accordingly, 1,019 fuel and energy companies were
placed on a "strategic enterprises" list of companies to be withheld from
privatization. 7 Even so, seven percent of the shares in the oil company,
Yukos, and fifteen percent of the shares in the oil company, Lukoil, are
among the state property to be sold to Russian and foreign investors.
The Russian government is depending on the privatization of the energy
industry to attract foreign investment and strengthen the nation's econo-
my.
A. The Oil and Natural Gas Industry
Russia's oil and gas resources are vast and of great importance to
the country and the rest of the globe. Russia possesses what are believed
to be the world's largest undeveloped oil fields.' Because of their size,
these fields, located in the area around the Caspian Sea, potentially are of
immeasurable value to the world at large.2 According to one source,
"[Tihe magnitude of Russia's reserves is believed to be greater than that
of Saudi Arabia and many other potent oil-producing nations."' Russia's
gas supplies are equally impressive. The country is currently the world's
largest producer of natural gas.'
During Soviet rule, the oil and gas industries in Russia were well-
funded and technologically advanced, but extremely wasteful and pollut-
ing. For several years, the Soviet Union expended at least half of its
nondefense capital budget on the natural gas industry alone.' This
"S See Russia's Second Privatization, supra note 14.
16 Id.
"7 See Russian Energy Firms 113 of Privatization Delay List, PLATr'S OILGRAM
NEWS, July 17, 1995, at 5.
"S See Russia's Second Privatization, supra note 14.
19 See Bill White, Energy Industry Leading Way to Capitalist Russia, HOUS.
CHRoN., Aug. 17, 1995, at 39.
m See id. at 39.
21 Sheila S. Hollis & John W. Berresford, Oil and Gas Law Reform in Russia:
Through the Smoke of Battle, 1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 111, 111 (1993).
White, supra note 19.
2 See id. Compared to defense expenditures, this large investment figure seems
impressive, but considering that investment in oil and gas is to make the industry
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enormous investment, however, paid off because Russia became the
world's largest natural gas producer during this period.24 As far as oil
was concerned, Soviet geologists and engineers helped to "[o]vercom[e]
immense institutional obstacles" to raise oil production to almost eleven
million barrels per day during the late 1980s.' This accounted for more
than one-sixth of the world's consumption of oil and was a production
level higher than that of any other country.'
Although Russia's production levels, its technology, and its invest-
ment in the energy industry were tremendous during the Soviet era,
environmental and efficiency concerns were ignored as they are today.
For instance, one 1989 estimate put the amount of oil lost by Russian oil
companies "through leaky pipes and wasteful refineries" at one-third of
the total processed.' Additionally, to "speed up construction" of pipe-
lines, builders installed cutoff valves at thirty-mile intervals instead of at
three-mile intervals, adding to the potential for large oil spills.'
Little has changed under the new Russian government. According to
some estimates, one out of every ten barrels of oil produced today in
Russia is spilled, amounting to 920,000 spilled barrels each day.' There
currently exists in Siberia a pool of spilled oil six feet deep, four miles
wide, and seven miles long."0 Because pollution was ignored during the
Soviet period, much of the scarce investment money now available to the
industry must be utilized to purchase safer and more efficient equipment,
rather than to increase production.3'
Russia's immense gas and oil resources, combined with its mixed
history of advanced technology and wastefulness and the current shaky
economic status of the country, make the position of the energy industry
today precarious. Nevertheless, the energy industry is more stable than
other Russian industries. Russia's energy sector remains relatively suc-
cessful, as the country is currently the world's second largest energy
productive enough to "underwrite the country's military-industrial complex" and not for
other reasons, lessens the impression. Marshall I. Goldman, The Russian Economy: Still
Murky, NEWSDAY (Nassau), Oct. 12, 1995, at A35.
24 See White, supra note 19.
2 Id.
' See id.
' Ann Imse, American Know-How ,and Russian Oil, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 7,
1993, at 28, 28.
28 See id.
2' See Douglas Stanglin et al., Toxic Wasteland, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr.
13, 1992, at 40, 42.
0 See id.
21 See Dr. A. Konoplyanik, Russia Struggling to Revive Production, Rebuild Oil
Industry, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 43, 44.
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producer, producing 13% of total world output.32 Even as its overall
economy in general still desperately seeks some kind of stability since
privatization, Russia has managed to lift most price controls in the oil
sector. However, domestic natural gas prices remain below cost.33
Other portions of the economy, though, have not seen the same
success as the energy sector. Since Russia gained its independence from
the Soviet Union, the economy nearly collapsed. One well-accepted
estimate is that the gross national product decreased by 50% between
1991 and 1994.3 Total inflation for 1995 is expected to be over
100%."5 Potential economic disasters prevent most industries from attract-
ing foreign investment. Conversely, production levels of natural gas have
been maintained, and oil production has declined only slightly.36
Because of the energy industry's success, the importance of oil and
gas to Russia's development of a continued and prosperous market
economy and to the maintenance of its current economy continues to be
great. Sales of oil and gas provide over half of the hard currency Russia
earns.37 Additionally, most of the foreign investment in Russian industry
is in the energy industry." Even so, Russia still lacks the capital neces-
sary to effectively develop its large reserves of oil and gas. "Oil and gas
are not 'just another commodity' in Russia."39 They are tremendously
important to the nation because of its dependence on income derived
from the industry, as well as its dependence on the energy it provides to
operate the nation's other industries and activities.'
32 See Christopher Hopson, Russia: Russian Oil Reforms Praised by lEA, LLOYDs'
LIsT, Sept. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
3' See id.
See Goldman, supra note 23. Much of Russia's gross national product today,
though, may be hidden as new businesses fail to report much of their income to hide
it from tax authorities. See id.
3 See Marshall Ingwerson, Russia's Bear Economy Goes Bullish as Reforms Kick
in, CHRIST. Sci. MoN., Oct. 10, 1995, at 6.
See White, supra note 19.
See id. But see Hopson, supra note 32 (estimating that forty-five percent of
Russia's hard currency receipts come from energy exports).
' See White, supra note 19; Russian Production Sharing Legislation Passed into
Law, Reuters, Jan. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File [hereinafter
Russian Production Sharing Legislation].
3 Hollis & Berresford, supra note 21, at 111.
See id.
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B. Current Developments
Understanding the importance oil and gas play in the country's
future, Russia is seeking to protect and improve the industry by cooperat-
ing with other countries, especially the United States, to obtain expertise
to successfully develop oil and gas policies. Russian Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice President Albert Gore Jr. are "spear-
heading efforts to improve the efficiency of the Russian oil and gas
sector, thereby raising productivity and reducing that industry's high
levels of pollution."4 In addition, American energy lawyers and engi-
neers are working with Russians to shape new energy law.42
Russia is also cooperating with the American company Conoco in
developing an Arctic oil field. This project is "the single largest direct
foreign investment in Russia," and is being touted as setting a "new
standard for environmental safeguards in the fragile far north."' In
addition to this project, Russia is teaming up with the Agency for Inter-
national Development.4' The Agency is funding an Oil and Gas Technol-
ogy Center in Russia whose goals will be to help stop the decline in
Russian oil production and ensure that U.S. technology is used to do
this.' All of these joint efforts have resulted in a "rapid evolution of
Russia's energy sector that has drawn heavily on American experi-
ence."
47
Russia is doing more, though, than just cooperating with the United
States and U.S. corporations. In July 1995, Russia signed a joint declara-
tion with the International Energy Agency (IEA), whose stated goals are
to reduce world dependence on oil conservation and research alternative
energy sources.' In September 1995, the agency released a 345-page
report on the energy policy of the Russian Federation.49 The report con-
4 Warren Christopher, U.S. Policy Toward the New Independent States: A Prag-
matic Strategy Grounded in America's Fundamental Interests, Address at Indiana
University-Bloomington (Mar. 29, 1995), in 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 353, 359
(1995).
42 See White, supra note 19.
3 See id.
4 Id.
, See Richard Williamson, The Clinton Administration's New Energy Policies, 2
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 115, 117 (1994).
4 See id.
4 See White, supra note 19.
See Igor Ivantsov, Energy Situation in Russia Analyzed, Tass, Sept. 11, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Tass File.
9 See Anastasiya Naryshkina, The State of Russia's Fuel and Energy Sector Ana-
lyzed by Foreign Experts, RUSDATA DIALINE-BIZEKON NEWS, Sept. 15, 1995, available
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tained IEA recommendations to the Russian government on how to best
"extricate the [energy] industry from crisis." 0 Thus, Russia is taking an
active role to protect its oil reserves from over-exploitation.
Although Russia is cooperating with outsiders to maintain and
improve its oil and gas industries in this new atmosphere of privatization,
Russia may lack the infrastructure necessary to accomplish these goals.
To create and maintain a viable market-oriented economy, Russia must
first have the proper institutional infrastructure to run the new econo-
my.5' Such institutions are well-developed in countries like the United
States, but are non-existent in the former Soviet states. According to Alan
Greenspan, what fuels the process of innovation necessary to a market
economy is "a whole infrastructure of market institutions," including
business professions like accounting, auditing, and marketing. 2
An adequate banking system is a necessary part of the infrastructure
needed to develop a successful market economy 3 For Russia to reform
its banking system to stimulate its newly emerging free market, large
amounts of investment capital must be infused into the system. 4 Then,
after an adequate banking system is established in Russia, these banks
"will facilitate the flow of foreign investment by making loans to ventur-
ers and providing a facility for savings and investment."55 Without these
institutions, foreign investment will not flow into Russia. Without foreign
investment, the nation's economy, which needs hard currency, will
continue to flounder.
in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
' Id. Recommendations include things such as separating the production of energy
sources from their transportation to foster competition and revoking preferred pricing for
former Commonwealth of Independent States trading partners. See id.
" See generally Goldman, supra note 23 (describing Russia's lack of institutional
infrastructure to support strict monetary policy); Alan S. Greenspan, Thoughts About the
Transitioning Market Economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 6
DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 1, 8-9 (discussing infrastructure necessary for market institutions);
Susanna V. Pullen, United States Foreign Banking and Investment Opportunities:
Branching Out to the Russian Federation, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 159 (1995) (arguing the
need for a strong banking system in Russia).
5 Greenspan, supra note 51, at 8-9.
Two problems with the current Russian banking system are a rigid application of
monetary policy and widespread corruption. The strict monetary policy kills new
businesses, while corruption, in the form of the Russian mafia, kills bankers--27 of
them have been killed between 1991 and 1995. See Goldman, supra note 23.
"' See Pullen, supra note 51, at 163.
53 Id.
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III. THE STATUS OF THE LAW
Before concluding that there is a need for a comprehensive legal
framework for the oil and gas industry, it is first necessary to understand
the current status of Russian law, both generally and as it relates specifi-
cally to the oil and gas industry. This section of the Note first discusses
the Russian constitution as it relates to the oil and gas industries. Next,
various Russian statutes affecting the new market-based economy are ana-
lyzed; followed by a discussion of the Law on Subsoil Resources, which
governs oil and natural gas collection along with the extraction of other
resources. 6 Finally, this section of the Note analyzes the various propos-
als for an oil and natural gas law and the recently passed production
sharing agreement legislation.
The Constitution of the Russian Federation states that "[a] unified
economic space, the free movement of commodities, services and financ-
es, and support for competition and freedom of economic activity shall be
guaranteed."57 The Constitution also provides for the recognition and
protection of private property, and nationally and municipally, govern-
ment-owned property." These concepts were the beginning of the new
market-oriented economy in Russia.
In addition to the Russian Constitution, various Russian statutes,
most of which were enacted when Russia first became an independent
state, govern private property and business in the more market-oriented
economy. The Law of the Russian Federation on Ownership in Russia
was the first statute to begin addressing market economy concerns such
as mortgages, inheritance, and joint ventures, all of which were deemed
legal by this law. 9 The Law on Ownership also states that foreigners
have the same property rights as Russian citizens, a provision that
presumably offers a measure of safety to foreign investors.60 The Law on
Ownership provides additionally that preferences in determining the rights
of ownership (that is, preferring one organization or person over another)
are not permitted. 6' This statute, which utilizes terms like "private own-
' Law of the Russian Federation, On Underground Resources (1992), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rrlaw File (describing the laws pertaining to subsoil resources
as for February 1992; also called the Subsoil Law) [hereinafter Law on Underground
Resources].
'7 KONST. RF art. 8 I.
58 Id. art. 8 T 2.
" Law on Ownership in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic arts. 1-2,
10-11, 24-27, 1991, translated and reprinted in BASIC LEGAL DOcUMENTs OF THE
RussIAN FEDERAnTON 71-86 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 1992).
60 Id. art. 27.
61 Id. arts. 30-32; see Baev, supra note 8, at 152.
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ership" and "private property," which were previously unknown in
Russian or Soviet law, marks an important turning point in Russian legal
history, as it codifies many of the principles taken for granted in market
economies.
The Law of the Russia Federation on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial
Activity63 is another landmark Russian statute because "for the first time
in the legislative history of Russia, the guarantees of the Russian Federa-
tion were laid out with specificity." The act provides for equal access
to all those participating in entrepreneurial activity in Russia, and states
that it applies to all forms of ownership by all persons.'
Another important statute governing Russian business is the Law of
the Russian Federation on Foreign Investments in Russia.' The Law on
Foreign Investments deals with losses from possible government expropri-
ation of property, a common source of nervousness for foreign investors
who are fearful of Russia returning to its recent past. The Law on
Foreign Investments protects against government expropriation by provid-
ing that "compensation ... must correspond to the real value of the in-
vestments to be nationalized." 7 This appears to provide protection for
investors worried about government takings of property in this yet
untested economic and governmental system. A major problem with this
assumption involves valuation. The criteria used to determine the "real
value" of taken property in Russia would not likely be the same criteria
used in Western nations, so that amounts awarded to foreign owners may
be far less than they might expect.68
Even so, the laws that exist in Russia illustrate numerous shortcom-
ings. For instance, in the context of joint ventures, "the law regarding the
valuation of property in the event the joint venture ceases to exist is
vague." This void in the laws understandably causes potential investors
62 See Baev, supra note 8, at 153.
Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity, Vedomosti Fed. Sobr. RF, 1990,
No. 30, Item 418, translated and reprinted in BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 59, at 183-205.
6 See Baev, supra note 8, at 153.
65 Id.
' Law on Foreign Investments in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic,
Vedomosti Fed. Sobr. RF, 1991, No. 29, Item 1008, translated and reprinted in BASIC
LEGAL DocUMENTs OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 59, at 263-80 [hereinafter
Law on Foreign Investments].
67 Id. art. 8.
See Dr. Peter Cameron, Creating a Legal Framework for Investment in the
Commonwealth of Independent States Energy Sector: Lessons from the Energy Charter
Experiment, 1 TULSA J. COM. & INT'L L. 233, 265 (1994).
69 MARK TOuREvSKI & EILEEN MORGAN, CurriNG THE RED TAPE: How WESTERN
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to be less likely to enter the market.0 Another weakness in current laws
involves the uncertainty and propensity of frequent legal change, as well
as the tendency for Russian laws to be confusing and in conflict with one
another.7 ' For instance, the Moscow City Council annulled leases granted
to foreign and domestic businesses for city office space even though
Moscow's mayor had previously approved the leases.' One estimate is
that Western oil companies might invest almost seventy billion dollars
each year to develop oil fields in Russia if it were not for their fear of
opportunism by the national and local Russian governments.'
Although Russia is beginning to promulgate laws to provide a
framework for expanding its new economic system, laws specifically
governing oil and gas are sparse and at a very early point in develop-
ment. In 1992, Russia enacted the Law on Subsoil Resources to govern
oil, gas, nonferrous metal, and precious metal extraction. The Subsoil
Law provides for "the payment of royalties, license fees, excise taxes and
payments to a fund for exploration and mineral replenishment. 7 5 These
payments appear disproportionately high for the oil and gas industries as
compared to the metal industries.76 For instance, royalties on the "value
of the extracted resources" are between six and sixteen percent for oil and
gas, between four and ten percent for precious metals, and between two
and six percent for nonferrous metals.' Payments to the fund for replen-
ishment are ten percent for oil and gas, but only 8.2% for non-ferrous
metals and 7.8% for gold."
Because these payments under the Subsoil Law are imposed in
addition to other general business taxes and fees, they cause a substantial
burden on the oil and gas industries. The payments, coupled with the
forced subsidization of agriculture and heavy industry, have caused some
COMPANIES CAN PROFrr IN THE NEW RussIA 73, 167 (1993); see Sergei Zozulya &
Yevgeni Fokeyev, Securing of Rights to Oil Fields in the Russian Federation, RUSSIAN
COMM. L., Oct. 1994, at 11, 11 (stating that another omission of Russian law is that
it does not provide for regulating the "legal relationship arising from the assignment of
rights to the use of mineral resources and securing them by law").
70 See TOUREVSKI & MORGAN, supra note 69, at 73.
7' See id. at 166-67; BIRENBAUM, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 6.
' See Geoff Winestock, Land Tax Hits JV Projects, Moscow TIMES, May 27,
1993, at I.
7 Imse, supra note 27, at 30.
7' Law on Underground Resources, supra note 56; Russell H. Pollack et al., Russia,
in ENERGY AND RESOURCES LAW 48, 49 (Christopher Zach ed., 1994).
" Pollack, supra note 74, at 49.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See id.
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energy companies to have financial difficulties such as being unable to
meet payroll requirements.79 With all of these financial obligations, "Itihe
combined financial burden often is simply too high to enable the investor
to realize a return it considers adequate."8 In fact, according to the IEA,
the cumulative effect of taxes and royalties in the Russian energy sector
can amount to over 100% of an enterprise's revenue.8' Such forced
expenditures leave an enterprise "unable to cover'costs, let alone finance
investments."'  Regardless of the financial ramifications of the Subsoil
Law, the statute seems to be "too general to provide a framework" for
large-scale investment in the oil and gas industry. 3
Seeing the need for more specific legislation for the energy industry,
several groups have tried to draft a Russian Federation Law on Oil and
Gas.84 The efforts are currently stalled. No legislation has yet been ap-
proved.' "A proliferation of draft laws has been followed by a period
of synthesis of drafts and comments on drafts, but after at least two years
of work, no law expressly concerned with oil and gas resources has yet
been enacted."86
However, four major drafts of a Law on Oil and Gas have been
proposed. The Gazeev-Hardy Draft was created to supplement the Subsoil
Law.' Under this draft, a specific regulating body would grant oil and
gas rights.8 The Tishcenko Draft was produced under the guidance of
Dr. A.S. Tishcenko, the Director of the All-Russia Scientific Research
Institute of Organization, Management, and Economy of the Oil and Gas
Industry. 9 Although this draft attempted to push the industry "in a clear
' See id. Russia requires that the energy industry charge agriculture and heavy
industry just one-third of the world market price for oil and gas. White, supra note 19.
' Pollack, supra note 78, at 49; see also Igor Ivantsov, Export Duties on Crude
Oil to Be Shortly Cut or Terminated, Tass, Sept. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Tass File (reporting Russian Minister for Fuel and Energy Yuri Shafranik's
statement that oil profits are "critically low"). But see Peter Reddaway, Better Than
Whitewater: Scandal Dogs Russia's Rising Star, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1995, at C3
(quoting economist Anders Aslund as saying that the oil and gas industries make vast
profits and pay virtually no taxes).
"t See Gerald Karey, lEA: Russia Reform Has Long Way to Go, PLATr's OILGRAM
NEWS, Sept. 15, 1995, at 4.
82 Id.
' Cameron, supra note 68, at 237.
l' id. at 236.
' See id.
SId.
See Konoplyanik, supra note 31, at 48-50; Cameron, supra note 68, at 239.
's Cameron, supra note 68, at 239.
'9 See id. at 239, 239 n.21.
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market direction," its major emphasis was on state participation. 9' An es-
pecially unique feature of the Tishcenko Draft was that technical experts
played a major role in its development, something unheard of with similar
legislation in the West.9' The Gazprom Draft was created under the di-
rection of experts from Gazprom,' the large Russian gas monopoly.'
Under this draft, the state would have sole ownership of the gas supply,
and would involve private companies in its production, exploration, and
processing." The fourth major draft, called the Perchik Draft, was devel-
oped as a compromise of the three previous drafts. This draft seemed "to
give the local and regional authorities a mandate to negotiate specific
deals," leaving little in the way of specifics to be decided by the law.-'
By creating only a general statutory framework, the Perchik Draft seems
to evidence a distrust for law as providing a workable solution to these
problems.
On December 30, 1996, President Boris Yeltsin signed the long-
awaited production sharing law that will govern production sharing agree-
ments involving oil, natural gas, and other resources.96 A production
sharing agreement (PSA) is a form of contract in which the host country
maintains the title to the resource to be developed and the foreign in-
vestor supplies capital, equipment, and personnel to complete the pro-
ject.' PSAs benefit companies by providing a predictable tax structure
independent of the country's tax system and by providing enhanced legal
recourse as the company and the country are parties to a joint contract. 98
PSAs benefit the host country by allowing it to retain title to the resource
and to share in production.9 Under the PSA legislation, an investing
company would cede a percentage of any oil or gas it finds to the
90 See id; see also id. at 240.
9' Id. at 239-40.
' Gazprom was privatized late in 1992, before the major privatization push began,
see supra note 7, and accompanying text, in a process that is "still murky." Reddaway,
supra note 81. One theory is that Gazprom's top managers received between one and
five percent of the newly formed corporation's stocks. Id. Current estimates of
Gazprom's real worth are between 250 billion and 700 billion dollars, which would
make some former managers billionaires. Id.
" See Cameron, supra note 68, at 239 n.17, 240.
94 Id. at 240-41.
9 See Cameron, supra note 68, at 242; see also Konoplyanik, supra note 31, at 50.
See David R. Nelson, Russia's Production Sharing Law -- A Foundation for
Progress, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 29, 1996, at 106, 106.
97 id.
" See id.
99 See id.
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Russian government in taxes and royalties.""° The Law On Production
Sharing Agreements apparently will provide an atmosphere of fair compe-
tition by treating both foreign and domestic investors equally, but a
number of problems will need to be addressed later in amendments to the
law.10'
Foreign investors had high hopes for the original draft version of the
law, but the version that made it to Yeltsin's desk is "vague and ram-
bling'0 and "severely watered down."' 3 One of the main problems
Western investors see in the law is the provision which would permit the
Russian government to unilaterally renegotiate agreement terms in the
event of a "substantial change in circumstances."" 4 Other provisions
creating hesitation in the minds of Western investors are restrictions on
the investor's right to transfer property rights and the failure of the law
to guarantee the investor's right to international arbitration. 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The Russian Federation's failure to effectuate any version of an Oil
and Gas Law or to develop another workable statute has left a void in
Russian energy law. The PSA legislation may be a step in the right
direction, but whether its flaws, especially the provision allowing unilater-
al renegotiation of agreement terms, can be corrected remains to be seen.
Russia has a rather detailed constitution, but the constitution is "merely
an enabling document," and legislation that is well-entrenched so as to
provide a semblance of security for investors, foreign and domestic alike,
is necessary to the success of Russia's oil and gas industry and its
economy." Necessary legislation to encourage foreign investment gener-
ally should include more refined laws on property rights, accounting
principles, foreign currency, and contracts."°
'4' See Russian Oil: A Little Crude, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 1996, at 68, 68.
202 Law of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on Production-Sharing
Agreements, 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1251 (1996); see Nelson, supra note 98, at
106.
,o Russian Oil: A Little Crude, supra note 100, at 68.
"'i Russian President Yeltsin Sign Weaker Oil Production-Sharing Law, INT'L TRADE
REP., Jan. 17, 1996, at 80.
" Law on Production-Sharing Agreements, supra note 104, ch. 1, art. 17; see also
Gregg Jones, Russian Law May Stall U.S. Oil Development: Ptoduction-Sharing Policy
Raising Roadblock, DALLAS MoRN. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1996, at 1F.
,o See Russian Oil: A Little Crude, supra note 100, at 68.
206 Gilder D. Jackson IV, Comment, Doing Business in Russia: A Practical Guide
for American Investors, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 111, 113 (1994).
7 See id.; see also Greenspan, supra note 51, at 8-9; Pullen, supra note 51, at
183-84.
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To encourage investment in the Russian energy industry specifically,
a comprehensive law guaranteeing rights pertaining to oil and gas and its
production, processing, or transportation is necessary. Former Communist
countries need to "overhaul their legal, managerial and economic systems,
as necessary prerequisites for remodeling the former centrally-planned
economies into productive and viable capital-based free-market econo-
mies."' ' This legislation should first focus on creating a stable system
to put investors at ease; it should reduce waste and pollution to protect
Russia's resources from depletion; it should prevent the need for costly
clean-up measures; and it should provide an understandable and specific
scheme of regulation to prevent local and national bureaucrats from
changing the rules mid-stream or developing conflicting policies.
Without a comprehensive system of law governing the Russian oil
and gas industries, foreign and even domestic investment will be minimal.
Without investment, the industries will not remain productive, and
Russia's supply of hard currency will dwindle. Without a strong energy
industry, the country's other industries will be left without a crutch and
will sink further into economic despair, leaving Russia's people and their
great experiment in democracy crushed.
"' Greenspan, supra note 51, at 1.
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